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Response 
How Many Wrongs Make a Copyright? 
Rebecca Tushnet†
INTRODUCTION 
 
Derek Bambauer’s provocative paper starts with a norma-
tive proposition: the remedies available to people who suffer 
unconsented distribution of intimate images of themselves, of-
ten known as revenge porn, are insufficient.1 Bambauer is es-
pecially critical of the secondary liability regime for privacy 
torts.2 At (First Amendment-inflected) common law, it is hard 
to hold distributors liable for such harm, and Congress has 
made it impossible online by enacting § 230 of the Communica-
tions Decency Act, which provides total immunity to a service 
provider uninvolved in developing tortious content.3 Copy-
right’s remedies, Bambauer observes, are much broader.4 And 
the lack of ability to control distribution is a disincentive for at 
least some people to create intimate pictures, even though the 
creation of intimate pictures might otherwise have social utili-
ty. Because copyright is justified as a means of incentivizing 
creation, but mostly because its remedies are good ones, we 
should therefore call the harm done by unconsented distribu-
tion of intimate images “copyright harm.”5
Bambauer is not the first to notice that copyright’s reme-
dies are far broader than those associated with other rights to 
control information. Some victims of unconsented distribution 
of intimate images have already turned to copyright claims—
 
 
†  Thanks to James Grimmelmann for helpful discussions and Rob 
McCabe for research assistance. Copyright © 2014 by Rebecca Tushnet. 
[Editor’s Note: This is a response to Derek Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. 
L. REV. 2025 (2014).] 
 1. See generally Derek Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025 
(2014). 
 2. Id. at 2054. 
 3. See id. at 2028. 
 4. Id. at 2052–56. 
 5. Id. at 2039–44. 
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mostly celebrities to date, but we can imagine more ordinary 
folks doing so as well.6 Likewise, trademark owners have made 
copyright claims when trademark’s remedies have proved in-
sufficient for their desires.7 So have victims of negative reviews, 
circumventing defamation’s strict limits on liability.8
So how should we think about Bambauer’s proposal? As 
Part I of this Response details, the proposal requires significant 
changes to every part of copyright—what copyright seeks to en-
courage, who counts as an author/owner, what counts as an ex-
clusive right, what qualifies as infringement, what suffices as a 
defense, and what remedies are available.
 Of course, 
those limits—like trademark’s limits—are there for a reason, 
and so too with the privacy torts generally thought most appo-
site to the harm done by unconsented distribution of intimate 
images. 
9
 
 6. See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Performance Anxiety: Copyright Em-
bodied and Disembodied, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209 (2013). 
  
 7. See, e.g., Euro-Excellence, Inc. v. Kraft Can., Inc., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 20 
(Can.) (rejecting trademark owner’s attempt to use copyright to evade limits 
on trademark rights); Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or 
“Chilling Effects”? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 668–
70, 678 (2006) (discussing noncopyright claims framed as copyright claims for 
purposes of benefiting from DMCA (Digital Millennium Copyright Act) 
takedown procedures); Fax from Creative Crystal Co. to Google, Inc. (Aug. 22, 
2003), available at http://www.chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?Notice 
ID=842 (requesting takedown of sites which use Creative Crystal’s registered 
trademarks “in meta tags and keywords up to 39 times on one page”); Letter 
from Sarah B. Deutsch, Vice President and Gen. Counsel for Verizon 
Commc’ns, Inc., to the U.S. Copyright Office 2 (Nov. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/onlinesp/comments/2011/initial/verizon.pdf (not-
ing DMCA notices sent on trademark grounds); Rebecca Tushnet, INTA: 
Pharma Panel and Keyword Panel, REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG (May 8, 
2012), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2012/05/inta-pharma-panel-and-keyword 
-panel.html (discussing trademark counsel’s advice to claim copyright in logos 
and other marks in order to expand rights). 
 8. See, e.g., Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 336 F.2d 303, 3–5 
(2d Cir. 1966) (describing how Rosemont tried to suppress a biography by buy-
ing copyrights of quoted articles); Eric Goldman, Ripoff Report Ordered to Stop 
Publishing User-Submitted Report—Giordano v. Romeo, TECH. & MKTG. L. 
BLOG (Jan. 4, 2011), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/01/ripoff_ 
report_o.htm (discussing case where a business sued critic for defamation and 
acquired copyright in critical post, then sent copyright takedown); Eric Gold-
man, You Shouldn’t Need a Copyright Lawyer to Pick a Dentist—Lee v. 
Makhnevich (Forbes Cross-Post), TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Apr. 23, 2013), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/04/you_shouldnt_ne.htm (explaining 
how some professionals have attempted to use copyright to remove negative 
online reviews). 
 9. See infra Part I. 
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Part II argues that these differences are not merely defini-
tional.10
Bambauer nonetheless argues that the harm he targets is 
close enough to copyright harm that the right he wants to grant 
can fairly be called a copyright right, because copyright—
particularly copyright’s concept of authorship—is normatively 
empty and can be filled any way we want to fill it.
 They go to the effects of the law as well as its goals. In-
centivizing intimacy is not the same thing as incentivizing cre-
ativity. The motivations that induce people to create and share 
intimate images are unlikely to be affected by a change in copy-
right law that both creators and abusive disseminators are ex-
tremely unlikely to understand. Copyright works, when it 
works, as incentive for economically motivated creators; it han-
dles the non-economically motivated poorly, and it has no real 
mechanism for communicating its rules to the laypeople en-
gaged in the bulk of the behavior Bambauer wishes to change. 
Misunderstood penalties will neither incent nor deter as hoped. 
11 He points 
to the inconsistencies and special pleading that abound in the 
current statute, and argues that adding a sexting epicycle to 
the current scheme wouldn’t make a difference worth protest-
ing.12
Bambauer’s true target is the secondary liability rules for 
privacy violations, particularly § 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act.
 I disagree, because of the profound misfit between every 
aspect of copyright and the interests at issue here. 
13 He argues that intermediaries should be subject 
to legal constraints for enabling the unconsented dissemination 
of intimate media, and that the intermediary liability he envi-
sions would be constitutional if based out of Title 17.14
Ultimately, I can’t agree that we ought to be realists when 
it comes to escaping § 230 and formalists when it comes to 
 I believe 
that avoiding privacy law’s secondary liability regime by calling 
the proposed cause of action “copyright” is a mistake. If the sec-
ondary liability rules are wrong and there should be a notice 
and takedown scheme for revenge porn—something I’m open to 
agreeing with—then they should be changed, not evaded. If the 
secondary liability rules are right, they should not be evaded. 
And the collateral damage from evasion should not be excused 
by claiming that copyright is already bollixed. 
 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2052–56. 
 12. Id. at 2076. 
 13. Id. at 2084–91. 
 14. Id. 
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evaluating the constitutionality of something labeled “copy-
right.” Bambauer argues both that the label “copyright” mat-
ters, because copyright is about something in particular and 
because violations of its exclusive rights deserve particular 
remedies, and also that the label is just a move in a language 
game.15
I.  WHY CALL IT COPYRIGHT?   
 Inconsistency is no great vice, but it’s no virtue either. 
The case for a new intellectual property (or more properly, pri-
vacy or dignity) right for people depicted in intimate photos and 
videos could most persuasively be made on its own merits. 
Copyright, though it has many complex and reticulated 
niches, has a general structure. Pamela Samuelson has recent-
ly undertaken a valuable taxonomic project on copyrightable 
subject matter, articulating criteria based on the history of and 
policies underlying copyright law for what should and shouldn’t 
be brought into the copyright regime (e.g., gardens, yoga, DNA 
sequences).16 While some of her criteria aren’t very relevant to 
Bambauer’s proposal, because he deals with photos and video 
that are already copyrightable subject matter and instead pro-
poses to change authorship and rights definitions,17 several 
others provide useful guidance. She suggests that, when con-
sidering an expansion of copyright law, we should consider the 
fit between copyright’s economic justification and the econom-
ic/incentive structure of the subject matter sought to be pro-
tected, specifically whether legal protection will spur invest-
ment into the production of multiple copies for the purpose of 
sale.18
This includes the appropriateness of the exclusive rights, the duration 
of rights, infringement standards, and copyright remedies, as well as 
 We should also consider the fit between the subject mat-
ter and the legal structure of copyright: 
 
 15. Id. at 2056–58. 
 16. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Are Gardens, Synthetic DNA, Yoga 
Sequences, and Fashions Copyrightable? (Feb. 1, 2013) (unpublished draft) (on 
file with author). 
 17. For example, the question of how long the subject matter at issue has 
existed and whether changed circumstances justify an expansion of copyright 
is less relevant to Bambauer’s proposal than to DNA sequences, as is whether 
the works communicate expressive content. Id. at 22.  
 18. Id. at 21. Relatedly, she suggests evaluating the similarity of creators 
and creative outputs in the proposed subject matter to the creators and crea-
tive outputs of conventional copyrightable works: “[T]he greater the mismatch 
in these respects, the more likely it is that an extension of copyright to new 
subject matters will cause distortions or result in misapplications that will 
undermine the integrity of the copyright regime.” Id. at 22. 
  
2350 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:2346 
 
copyright doctrines, such as the idea/expression distinction, the 
scenes a faire and merger, fair use and first sale, classroom and other 
performance limitations, and the procedures by which copyright in-
fringement is judged. Often proponents of an expansion in copyright 
subject matter focus on a subset of the features of copyright’s legal re-
gime, while ignoring respects in which a mismatch exists. While spe-
cial rules can sometimes be developed to adjust the fit in copyright 
law, the legal regime fit should be an important criterion in judging 
whether subject matter expansion is a sound idea.19
In line with Samuelson’s framework, the following subsec-
tions explore what Bambauer proposes to change—which turns 
out to be pretty much every aspect of copyright. The overall ef-
fect is that the right he wants to create can’t be called “copy-
right” under any current meaning of the term. 
 
A. WHAT IS THE INCENTIVE-BASED JUSTIFICATION FOR THE 
RIGHT? 
The subject matter of copyright has traditionally been lim-
ited by the concept of encouraging creation of expression, not 
just creation more generally. The threat of underproduction of 
an intangible value is addressed many different ways in law. 
Patent, design patent, trade secret, trademark dilution, and the 
right of publicity all, at least according to their proponents, 
seek to encourage production by giving owners a right to ex-
clude.20
As noted by Bambauer and others, the right of privacy can 
also be seen to protect incentives generated by exclusive con-
trol.
 
21
 
 19. Id. at 21–22.  
 The question is—control over what? The answer usually 
allows us to identify the category of legal right at issue. When 
we want the creator to have control over innovation, the rele-
vant law is patent or trade secret. When we want the creator to 
have control over marketing value, the relevant law is trade-
mark dilution or the right of publicity. Bambauer proposes to 
shift the locus of control over intimate expression from the 
right of privacy to copyright, but identifying “incentives” for 
 20. See, e.g., Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 524 (1871) (de-
sign patent); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2107 (2013) (patent); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 
cmt. a (1995) (trade secret); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICI-
TY & PRIVACY § 2.2 (1987) (right of publicity); William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 308–
09 (1987) (trademark dilution). 
 21. See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2088–91. 
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“production” in general doesn’t justify putting anything into the 
copyright category in particular.22
Privacy, and the related ability to control the presentation 
of one’s self, support the development of that self.
 
23 Privacy 
provides a space for experimentation, self-discovery, and inti-
macy, all of which are goods worth having. Intimate media, 
Bambauer argues, can further these missions of self-discovery 
and intimate communication, and therefore incentivizing the 
creation of intimate media fits within copyright’s incentive par-
adigm.24 Tangible indicia of intimacy and self-discovery, howev-
er, are valuable to self-development not because they are tangi-
ble, and not because they contain creative expression—those 
are just incidental phenomena related to the fact that modern 
Americans live digital, mediated lives—but rather because they 
support this private, desiring, intimate self. As a result, the in-
centives Bambauer wishes to provide are not directed at gener-
ating expression fixed in a tangible medium, the traditional—
and constitutionally required—subject matter of copyright.25
The examples Bambauer uses also show that the targeted 
harm is not about expression, but rather about the social mean-
ing of exposure (especially for women): 
 
Privacy’s intimacy-promoting goals would be equally well-
served by (1) protecting nonexpressive/factual intimate com-
munications, including communications too basic or standard to 
be deemed protectable by copyright under conventional copy-
right doctrine, and by (2) protecting unfixed communications 
such as real-time telephone conversations, video chats, or even 
face-to-face gossip.  
 
 22. Id. at 2091. 
 23. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 
1906 (2013) (“Privacy is shorthand for breathing room to engage in the pro-
cesses of boundary management that enable and constitute self-
development.”); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 
477, 532 (2006) (“The risk of disclosure can prevent people from engaging in 
activities that further their own self-development.”). 
 24. I therefore find it curious that Bambauer argues that privacy theory 
does not recognize the benefits of intimate media. See Bambauer, supra note 1, 
at 2088. His description seems to me to fit very well into a discourse about the 
benefits of privacy, which include intimate interactions.  
 25. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (allowing Congress to protect 
“[w]ritings” of “[a]uthors,” both terms with arguable limiting force); 17 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in 
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”); 
Feist Publ’ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (“Original-
ity is a constitutional requirement . . . . [O]riginality requires independent 
creation plus a modicum of creativity . . . .”). 
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A female Yale Law School student targeted by defamatory attacks, 
including about her intimate life, on the AutoAdmit web site did not 
obtain a single summer job offer during on-campus recruiting with 
law firms . . . . A student teacher was denied a degree in education af-
ter inadvertently revealing a MySpace photo that showed her drink-
ing an alcoholic beverage while wearing a pirate costume. A Georgia 
high school teacher was forced to resign after a parent gained access 
to her Facebook profile and found a photo of her holding a pint of beer 
and glass of wine during a trip to Europe. In Florida, a high school 
English teacher was also pressed into quitting her job after her prin-
cipal found photos of her modeling swimsuits, under a different name, 
online. Finally, Citibank terminated a female employee simply be-
cause she was judged to be both attractive and given to wearing 
clothes that accentuated her appeal.26
Notice that all these examples involve gender role en-
forcement (including concerns about women’s public consump-
tion of alcohol), but not intimate media. That Bambauer rightly 
identifies them as part of the same problem as nonconsensual 
distribution of intimate media indicates that the harm is some-
thing different than what his proposed solution targets.
 
27 “Re-
venge porn employs the darker part of the human emotional 
spectrum: shame, humiliation, fear, and disgust,”28 and it is 
that source of harm that privacy/dignity-based torts target. By 
contrast, copyright usually refuses to recognize harm to the 
copyright owner’s dignity as a source of actionable harm: Anne 
Rice may feel personally assaulted by bad reviews or parodies,29
Bambauer’s proposal would give copyright new missions: 
incentivize the creation of intimacy and prevent harms from 
exposure, mainly harms suffered by women. These might well 
be valid goals, but not ones that fit copyright’s contours.  
 
but that’s just too bad for her unless the attack rises to the lev-
el of defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
B. WHO COUNTS AS THE AUTHOR/OWNER OF THE RIGHT? 
Bambauer’s proposed right is not a conventional author-
ship right. Instead of the author of the fixed work—the person 
or persons who contributed sufficient copyrightable creativity 
and exercised sufficient control over the final work—being the 
 
 26. See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2040–41 (footnotes omitted). 
 27. Cf. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the 
State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 365, 365–68 (1982) (noting 
that sexualized advertising does the same kind of harm as pornography). 
 28. See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2043 (footnote omitted). 
 29. Sarah Lyall, The People Have Spoken, and Rice Takes Offense, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/11/books/11rice.html?_ 
r=1&. 
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copyright owner, the subject would own a “copyright” interest 
under Bambauer’s model. Each subject would enjoy a right to 
prevent distribution of intimate media, even as against the per-
son who would otherwise be deemed the copyright owner.30 This 
new right would apparently cover all “intimate media,”31 but 
the proposed definition doesn’t include any requirement that 
the media have been created with intent to limit distribution. 
Thus, it would appear to work a profound change in the default 
ownership rules for pornography as well as for any other photos 
and video containing sexually explicit elements, something one 
might imagine both the adult entertainment and the main-
stream film/TV industry might wish to weigh in on before en-
actment.32
Also unlike a regular copyright right, the intimate media 
right would be waivable (in writing), but not alienable.
 
33 Copy-
rights can presently be licensed nonexclusively based on oral 
agreements or by implication from the parties’ conduct.34
 
 30. See Bambauer, supra note 
 
1, at 2058 (describing that the proposal 
would “curtail the distribution and display rights enjoyed by the copyright 
owner of intimate media”). It is also unclear whether this new interest would 
affect the copyright term, which for works not created as works for hire is life 
of the author plus seventy years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). Logically, we could 
treat the new copyright owner the same way we treat joint authors—the term 
of a joint work is the life of the longest-surviving author plus seventy years. 
Id. § 302(b).  
 31. Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2056. 
 32. Bambauer proposes that this right will be waivable in writing, but 
that’s not sufficient for the modern film industry, which universally seeks 
work-for-hire status so that the funding/producing entity is deemed the author 
of the work from the outset. See id. at 2073. Among other things, a mere copy-
right transfer from the performer is terminable after thirty-five years. See 17 
U.S.C. § 203 (2012). Perhaps Bambauer means that waiver should not be con-
sidered a “transfer” and therefore not terminable; if so, his proposal has yet 
another point of divergence from current copyright law. No court would allow 
the use of the term “waiver” to defeat § 203 termination rights in other cir-
cumstances; § 203 was designed to be unwaivable. Cf. Marvel Characters, Inc. 
v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that an after-the-fact 
agreement that a work was a work for hire is an unenforceable “agreement to 
the contrary” that can’t prevent termination given Congress’s intent to protect 
authors). Or perhaps Bambauer would allow the creation of works for hire 
outside the scope of this new right, which for nonemployees would require 
(1) a written agreement, and (2) that the work fall within the enumerated 
statutory categories of works that can be works for hire. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2012). In the case of standalone photographs, this might prove a bit tricky, 
since it’s hard to jam photos into any of those categories, but for films and pho-
tos intended for inclusion in magazines and the like it could probably be done 
with relative ease.  
 33. See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2059. 
 34. See, e.g., Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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Bambauer’s rule for intimate media would require a written 
agreement even for a nonexclusive license.35 Likewise, because 
one problem that arises in intimate media is that one member 
of a couple shares a sex tape featuring both of them, waiver by 
one participant would not waive others’ rights, again in con-
trast to existing law, including the existing moral rights provi-
sions in the Copyright Act;36 presently, joint authors can grant 
nonexclusive licenses without the consent of other joint au-
thors.37
C. WHAT QUALIFIES AS INFRINGEMENT? 
  
Bambauer proposes that the owner of the intimate media 
right would have the right to prevent distribution of the work.38 
This right would apparently not be the right to authorize dis-
tribution without the consent of the person who would ordinari-
ly be considered the copyright owner, but a purely prohibitory 
right. So, if the subject wasn’t also the cameraperson, she 
wouldn’t by herself be able to authorize distribution. By con-
trast, existing copyright rights are rights to authorize, not just 
rights to prohibit; as noted in the previous section, joint au-
thors can grant licenses without other authors’ consent.39
In addition, the intimate media right would go beyond the 
current § 106 right to control public performance and display 
and create a new right to control private performance and dis-
play.
 It is 
not clear whether this negative right would have the same du-
ration as a copyright (currently life plus seventy years). 
40
 
 35. See Bambauer, supra note 
 The right would thus cover instances in which a recipi-
ent called his friends over to look at the image on his phone, 
which again sounds more like a privacy right than a copyright.  
1, at 2059–60. 
 36. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012) (granting limited moral rights of 
attribution and integrity to certain works of visual art); id. (providing that 
joint authors are co-owners of these moral rights). 
 37. See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2038 (“Even if a participant were 
deemed a joint author of the intimate media [under existing law], she would be 
powerless to prevent her co-author from giving permission for the work’s use, 
regardless of her wishes.”). 
 38. Id. at 2058. Bambauer also proposes that only actual images should be 
covered. Id. at 2094. I’m not sure this definition would be likely to survive the 
drafting process—why not also cover avatars? The interest in them, especially 
as they improve in verisimilitude, is likely to be similar, and the right of pub-
licity has similarly expanded to cover virtual representations. See, e.g., Hart v. 
Elec. Arts, 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 39. See supra Part I.B. 
 40. See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2093. 
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D. WHAT ARE THE DEFENSES TO INFRINGEMENT? 
Bambauer proposes to eliminate the existing defenses to 
copyright infringement for intimate media, including most no-
tably fair use, though presumably the exceptions for education-
al institutions, nonprofit performances, etc. would also all have 
to go.41
Because the “intimate media” definition would cover all 
sexual photos and visuals, even if they were created for distri-
bution, this could have significant effects on fair use cases, 
which often involve sexuality.
  
42 Consider the recent and already 
influential case Prince v. Cariou,43 in which appropriation artist 
Richard Prince took photos of Rastafarians and combined them 
with images of naked women taken from soft-core magazines:44
The photographer mostly lost his infringement claim be-
cause the use was transformative, bringing new messages and 
new meanings to the original photos. But under Bambauer’s 
new rule, the models portrayed in the soft-core magazines 
would have a valid infringement claim (against Prince and 
against me) because they didn’t consent to Prince’s use. 
 
  
 
 41. See id. at 2068. 
 42. See Rebecca Tushnet, My Fair Ladies: Sex, Gender, and Fair Use in 
Copyright, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L., 273, 278–79 (2007). 
 43. Prince v. Cariou, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 44. Richard Prince, Djuana Barnes (2008), displayed at The Gagosian 
Gallery. 
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Bambauer offers a slightly different scenario: 
Consider an artist who uses a photograph of his naked partner in his 
artwork—perhaps he is mashing up Soviet-era propaganda images 
with nude photos. That display of the intimate photo is highly trans-
formative, pushing the analysis towards finding the use fair. But, this 
is irrelevant to his partner, who may not want the photo displayed, 
regardless of its artsy surroundings. The possibility of being involun-
tarily featured may dissuade her from posing for the photo at all.45
The use of the hypothetical partner, instead of the image 
ripped from a magazine (as occurred in Cariou
 
46), leaves the 
impression that the problem is only relational (making it ap-
propriate for a privacy tort), so that we needn’t worry about fair 
use. But fair use’s transformativeness doctrine specifically fa-
vors precisely the kinds of uses that make copyright owners, 
and sometimes the subjects of their works, feel bad—critical, 
mocking, even cruel uses.47 These fair uses may decrease the 
incentive to produce works compared to a world in which criti-
cism wasn’t allowed, but copyright has deliberately chosen not 
to provide that kind of incentive to authors and owners.48
Bambauer proposes to substitute a newsworthiness de-
fense for fair use.
  
49
But newsworthiness isn’t a copyright defense.
 That would still seem to spell trouble for 
Richard Prince (though maybe not for me), as the specific im-
ages of the women in the pictures are unlikely to be newswor-
thy, though I can imagine some courts contorting themselves to 
find newsworthiness based on the women’s prior consent to ap-
pear in a soft-core magazine.  
50
 
 45. See Bambauer, supra note 
 If fair use 
is a poor fit for the interests that the proposal addresses, they 
might not be copyright interests. As Bambauer notes, there are 
existing causes of action that have newsworthiness defenses 
and don’t have fair use defenses. They’re privacy torts, whose 
precedent Bambauer suggests courts could incorporate in defin-
1, at 2068–67 (footnotes omitted).  
 46. See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 698. 
 47. See, e.g., Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 113–14 
(2d Cir. 1998).  
 48. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591–92 (1994) 
(“[W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills demand for the 
original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act. Be-
cause ‘parody may quite legitimately aim at garroting the original, destroying 
it commercially as well as artistically,’ the role of the courts is to distinguish 
between ‘[b]iting criticism [that merely] suppresses demand [and] copyright 
infringement[, which] usurps it.’” (citations omitted)). 
 49. See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2068.  
 50. Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 557 (1985). 
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ing the boundaries of the new defense.51
E. WHAT ARE THE REMEDIES FOR INFRINGEMENT? 
 But if privacy and 
newsworthiness go so well together, what’s wrong with using 
the existing privacy torts? Bambauer’s answer is that the trou-
ble lies with existing remedies, to which I now turn. 
1. Statutory Damages 
Statutory damages, enforced by private parties, are one 
key reason to choose copyright instead of some other law, ac-
cording to Bambauer.52 But, though Bambauer says “[d]amages 
would follow copyright’s established system,”53 he proposes to 
change that system. Bambauer notes that getting a lawyer to 
take a revenge porn case is difficult, and so is getting a lawyer 
to take an ordinary copyright case.54 Some revenge porn cases 
won’t involve works that were timely registered (registered be-
fore the infringement began or within a few months of publica-
tion),55 and timely registration is a prerequisite for an award of 
statutory damages and attorney’s fees, even assuming that the 
individual infringer had enough cash to pay an award.56 
Bambauer would solve this problem by removing the timely 
registration requirement for statutory damages.57
 
 51. See Bambauer, supra note 
 
1, at 2068. 
 52. Id. at 2081.  
 53. Id. at 2086. 
 54. Cf. MICKEY H. OSTERREICHER & ALICIA WAGNER CALZADA, NAT’L 
PRESS PHOTOGRAPHERS ASS’N, COMMENTS OF THE NATIONAL PRESS PHOTOG-
RAPHERS ASSOCIATION 1 (Oct. 19, 2012), available at http://blogs.nppa.org/ 
advocacy/files/2012/10/Copyright-Small-Claims-NPPA-Comments-10-19-12r 
.pdf (describing photo infringement as rampant online and stating that “copy-
right infringement is a pernicious problem. Not only has it reduced the profit-
ability of our clients . . . but has also created overly burdensome legal costs 
which act as an impediment to pursuing legal remedies in federal court.”). 
 55. I’m not so sure about this—the works involved in revenge porn cases 
may well count as unpublished, as long as the creator didn’t publish them her-
self. Distribution to a limited group with no purpose of further distribution is 
probably not publication. Thus, registration before filing suit might well quali-
fy the victim for statutory damages, assuming she is the copyright owner. See 
Deborah R. Gerhardt, Copyright Publication: An Empirical Study, 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 135, 147 (2011). And juries probably would consider the awful-
ness of the disseminator’s harassing and demeaning motive in setting a statu-
tory damage award, even though that’s not generally a factor in copyright 
statutory damage awards (again, because revenge porn doesn’t implicate ordi-
nary copyright interests). 
 56. See Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2065. 
 57. Id. 
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But there is no reason that a standalone, sui generis law 
against revenge porn couldn’t also allow for private remedies, 
including statutory damages. No reason, that is, other than 
§ 230, which would block the imposition of statutory damages 
on intermediaries, even ones who refused to honor takedown 
requests after a plaintiff succeeded in winning a claim against 
an unauthorized sharer of intimate media.58 The sharers them-
selves, however, could likely be made individually liable for 
statutory damages under a specifically drafted law targeting 
revenge porn as a privacy tort—this could supplement or re-
place potential criminal liability.59 At the very least, it would be 
fruitful to explore the justifications for and potential arguments 
against a sui generis right, as Pam Samuelson and Jerome 
Reichman among others have done with respect to other inter-
ests that don’t fit well with current intellectual property re-
gimes.60
Statutory damages still might not be enough to convince an 
attorney to sue a victim’s horrible ex-boyfriend, unless he also 
happens to have $150,000 in the bank. Only big firms tend to 
seek statutory damages against petty infringers like music 
uploaders Jammie Thomas and Joel Tenenbaum.
 
61
 
 58. See Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 
929, 930 (D. Ariz. 2008) (allowing an intermediary to refuse original poster’s 
request to take down content and still keep § 230 protection). 
 There is not 
much chance these statutory damages awards will ever be paid, 
and the recording industry couldn’t have thought they would 
be; its lawyers got paid to send a message.  
 59. See Danielle Keats Citron, ‘Revenge Porn’ Should Be a Crime in U.S., 
CNN OPINION (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/29/opinion/citron 
-revenge-porn/index.html?hpt=hp_t4; Mary Anne Franks, Combating Non-
Consensual Pornography: A Working Paper (Dec. 5, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2336537 (proposing a draft 
criminalization bill). 
 60. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property 
Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 113–37 (1997) (discussing justifications 
for and arguments against sui generis protection for data); Pamela Samuelson 
et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2310–12 (1994) (arguing for sui generis protection for 
computer programs). 
 61. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in 
Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 454 
(2009) (noting that in practice statutory damages are mainly sought by large 
firms). 
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The only predictable, law-abiding deep pockets in this area 
belong to intermediaries, which is why Bambauer also suggests 
changing the law governing them.62
2. Intermediary Liability 
 
Bambauer proposes altering 17 U.S.C. § 512, which cur-
rently provides a notice and takedown scheme for alleged copy-
right infringement.63 He suggests that § 512 should be altered 
with respect to intimate media specifically, and that this would 
be simple to implement because internet service providers are 
already familiar with this provision (known as DMCA notice 
and takedown).64 The new system would be similar to the exist-
ing DMCA, but with different information provision and redac-
tion requirements. It’s not clear whether Bambauer supports 
the existing DMCA rule that a counter-notification entitles the 
intermediary to restore access to the accused work unless the 
claimant files suit.65
Nor is it clear that Bambauer would allow existing defens-
es for intermediaries. Compliance with the DMCA provides re-
lief from any money damages that would otherwise be available 
to a plaintiff, but, even for non-DMCA compliant services, the 
ordinary rules of secondary liability would still require the 
plaintiff to establish that the intermediary was contributorily 
or vicariously liable for the infringing content before any reme-
dy could be available against the intermediary.
  
66
 
 62. See Bambauer, supra note 
 A blogger who 
allows comments may not have a DMCA agent on file with the 
Copyright Office and would therefore be ineligible for DMCA 
protection, but the blogger is still not automatically liable for 
infringement when a commenter posts infringing material. 
Thus, in some circumstances, an intermediary could choose 
1, at 2085. 
 63. Id. at 2055. 
 64. Id.; see id. at 2056–69 (describing new system). 
 65. He speaks of the subject’s written consent as a defense, and of the in-
termediary’s immunity after complying with a takedown notice as a reason not 
to worry about the intermediary’s difficulty in verifying written consent. Id. at 
2067. But that just means the intermediary will always take down content 
whenever a notice is proper in form, in order to secure that immunity. Should 
a counter-notification that claims to have written consent be sufficient to lead 
to a “put-back”? The copyright analogy would suggest that the answer is yes, 
since the intermediary is in no position to judge the facts. 
 66. See, e.g., Disney Enters. v. Hotfile Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 
(S.D. Fla. 2011) (finding Hotfile ineligible for DMCA safe harbor, but not nec-
essarily liable on contributory infringement theory). 
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noncompliance with notice and takedown and still avoid liabil-
ity under existing law.67
I’m unsure that the problems of intimate media distribu-
tion are amenable to the DMCA solution. One major source of 
trouble in the sexting realm has been photos shared through 
secure messaging services (SMS). Those systems aren’t set up 
to make notice and takedown effective, and standard phone 
networks that carry SMS don’t meet the underlying standards 
for secondary copyright liability (though, again, perhaps 
Bambauer is also willing to change those).
 
68
F. SUMMARY: A RIGHT GRANTED BY TITLE 17, NOT A 
COPYRIGHT 
 Traditional web-
sites would be covered by this new right, but to the extent that 
intimate media circulate in different ways from the average 
DMCA target does, that’s a further indication that what we 
have isn’t a copyright problem. 
Bambauer proposes a right with a different justification 
from copyright, owned by someone other than the ordinary cop-
yright owner, infringed by different acts, with different defens-
es, and with different remedies. When you’re making this many 
changes, it might be time to admit that the proposal does not 
involve copyright, but rather a sui generis right placed in Title 
17 for another purpose. That purpose, as the next Part ex-
plores, is to avoid CDA § 230. This makes his proposal notably 
distinct from other not-quite-copyright interventions into the 
statute such as microchip design protection or vessel hull de-
sign protection. 
 
 67. There are other ways to evade liability, of course: not all websites are 
amenable to U.S. jurisdiction. See Lorelei Laird, Victims Are Taking on ‘Re-
venge Porn’ Websites for Posting Photos They Didn’t Consent To, A.B.A. J., 
Nov. 1, 2013, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/victims_are_taking_ 
on_revenge_porn_websites_for_posting_photos_they_didnt_c (“It’s an inexpen-
sive way to get photos taken down—if it works. But website operators overseas 
or those who believe they’re judgment-proof can and do ignore the [DMCA] no-
tices . . . . And as [Professor Eric] Goldman notes, foreign websites don’t care 
about DMCA takedown notices. Indeed, several sites have reportedly moved to 
overseas hosts to avoid legal consequences in the U.S.”). 
 68. See Luvdarts, LLC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 710 F.3d 1068, 1072–73 
(9th Cir. 2013) (holding owners of multimedia messaging networks couldn’t be 
held liable for copyright infringement by users; plaintiff couldn’t successfully 
allege contributory or vicarious liability). 
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II.  WHY NOT CALL IT COPYRIGHT?   
Why are all these changes required to make revenge porn 
fit a copyright model? In this Part, I suggest that renaming the 
problem of revenge porn is unlikely to help us solve it. The in-
centive theory does not justify creating a new intimate media 
right in Title 17, because copyright doctrine’s levers for affect-
ing human motivations don’t fit the behaviors at issue, though 
privacy law’s might. Copyright law’s present messiness is an 
insufficient justification for making so many alterations to cop-
yright’s foundations, and the constitutional issues raised by the 
new right will still exist no matter its statutory surrounding. 
Finally, calling a new right a “copyright” has risks of its own, 
given Bambauer’s desire to evade § 230.  
A. NOT ALL INCENTIVES ARE THE SAME69
This mismatch between copyright’s incentive paradigm 
and the benefits of intimate communication isn’t just theoreti-
cal or definitional. It can’t be fixed by deciding that we want 
“copyright” to incentivize more than just expression.
 
70 
Bambauer writes that “the classic justification for copyright” is 
that “the threat of uncontrolled copying deters potential crea-
tors.”71 The extent to which copyright incentivizes expression in 
the first place—as opposed to distribution—is hotly contested.72
 
 69. Bambauer proposes a right to suppress dissemination. This is not nec-
essarily economic in nature, just as there are some personhood-based accounts 
of copyright rights that value the right to withhold works. See, e.g., Harper & 
Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 551 (1985). But it is ultimate-
ly enforced by the prospect of damages against ISPs who refuse to honor 
takedown notices. See Bambauer, supra note 
 
And Bambauer’s description of copyright cuts off the specifical-
ly economic rationale of the copyright story: the threat of un-
controlled copying deters potential creators who need or want 
1, at 2065–66. This is its primary 
difference from current law, which is why I speak of economic incentives. 
 70. See generally Bambauer, supra note 1. 
 71. Id. at 2038. 
 72. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Copyright Without Creators, 9 REV. L. 
& ECON. 389 (2013) (arguing that copyright makes the most sense conceived of 
as an incentive for intermediaries to invest in monetization of authors’ crea-
tions). Copyright might well use distribution purely instrumentally as a tool to 
compensate and incentivize authors. See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Dissemi-
nation Must Serve Authors: How the U.S. Supreme Court Erred, 10 REV. 
ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 1 (2013). My point is that copyright is gen-
erally thought of as an incentive for creation because copyright protects works 
once publicly disseminated, usually for profit. See id. 
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to get paid for creating works.73
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to 
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public 
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in “Science and 
useful Arts.” Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities de-
serve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.
 As the Supreme Court ex-
plained: 
74
This is why copyright provides primarily economic rights, 
with only extremely limited moral rights for certain limited-
edition visual works,
 
75 and why sometimes copyright provides 
only compulsory licenses—a right to get paid—instead of a 
right to control.76 The right to get paid is deemed sufficient to 
induce creation of the kinds of works copyright seeks to incen-
tivize.77
Bambauer later gives a more complete account of the con-
ventional justification, noting that:  
 
[a]uthors face the time and expense of creating works initially, and 
must price this sunk cost into their per-copy fee (average cost) . . . . 
Copyright law is one way out of this dilemma [in which consumers 
would prefer to get a copy from a lower-cost copier who didn’t invest 
in creation]: it forces consumers to pay the author, at average cost, to 
bribe the author to produce the work initially.78
But, as Bambauer immediately acknowledges, the “time and 
expense” faced by the ordinary author creating with the hope of 
remuneration is not the same as the intimate risks Bambauer 
identifies that might stop a potential creator of intimate media 
in her tracks.
 
79 With intimate media, creators aren’t looking to 
be “bribed” to surrender their photos.80
 
 73. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, 471 U.S. at 558 (“[T]he Framers 
intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.”). 
 Nor are copyists gener-
ally looking to sell the photos once acquired. 
 74. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (emphasis added). 
 75. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). 
 76. 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2012). 
 77. Cf. WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP, TECHNOLOGY, LAW, 
AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (2007) (proposing to replace most of 
copyright with compulsory licenses to better fulfill its incentive function in the 
digital age). 
 78. Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2044–45. 
 79. Id. (“This simple economic story falls apart completely for intimate 
media. People create these videos and images for non-pecuniary reasons: to 
express affection and lust, to remain connected to an existing partner, to court 
a new one.”). 
 80. Id. 
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Even creators of works who intend them to be distributed 
are only patchily affected by copyright’s incentives, and the 
failure to fit is even greater with intimate works not intended 
for public distribution.81 Bambauer’s example of the disparate 
use of intimate media by LGBT individuals is an excellent il-
lustration of the issue:82
But set that all aside for the moment. To get an incentive 
effect from an extension of legal protection, people would have 
to know the law and believe that they can effectively make use 
of it if their trust is betrayed.
 it is hard to imagine that sexual iden-
tity is correlated with anything copyright might incentivize, or 
with knowledge of the difference between the DMCA and § 230 
of the CDA. Rather (on the assumption that current law offers 
no protection), LGBT individuals may simply be bearing more 
risks in their relationships, as they do in many other ways, re-
gardless of the state of intellectual property and privacy law. 
83 Both of these assumptions are 
hard to credit. At the start, there’s the optimism bias 
Bambauer discusses: just as most people who get married are 
sure that they will not be among the large percentage of cou-
ples who divorce, most people who send intimate media are 
sure they will not be victims of a perfidious partner.84 ’As one 
victim recounted, “He said if I didn’t want to send them to him, 
that meant that I didn’t trust him, which meant that I didn’t 
love him.”85 As she told the New York Times, even after her ex-
perience of having her pictures posted online—which included 
being stalked by a stranger—her own friends continued to send 
nude pictures of themselves to their boyfriends.86 “You don’t 
want to really think that five years down the line, your boy-
friend at the time could be your not-boyfriend and do something 
really bad to you.”87
 
 81. See Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace 
Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 513–46 (2009) (discussing nonmon-
etary incentives for creation); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as In-
centives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29 (2011). 
 
 82. Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2034–35. 
 83. See, e.g., id. at 2048–49 (“[T]he minority of people who sext are well 
aware of the risks of doing so. Their numbers would probably grow if those 
risks dropped.” (footnote omitted)).  
 84. Id. at 2042. 
 85. See, e.g., Erica Goode, Once Scorned, but on Revenge Site, Twice Hurt, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2013, at A11 (quoting victim). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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In addition to the optimism bias, people simply don’t think 
about the law when they create intimate media, which means 
that increased legal protection wouldn’t spur more creation. In 
order for Bambauer’s incentives to work, creators of intimate 
media would have to believe that the change in the legal regime 
had been absorbed by recipients with enough certainty that the 
recipients would be noticeably more likely to hesitate—while in 
the mood to get revenge—before sharing.88 It is hard to imagine 
a rational calculation in this form: “yes, I don’t trust him all the 
way, and he might show the pictures to all his friends, but I’d 
be able to sue him and his ISP for damages if he did, so that 
gives me the extra confidence I need to send the pictures.”89
In practice, these calculations aren’t done consciously, but 
rather with the aid of background heuristics, expectations, and 
assumptions. But those assumptions aren’t likely to be correct. 
Misunderstandings about law, particularly intellectual proper-
ty law, are widespread.
  
90
 
 88. See generally Bambauer, supra note 
 To the extent that people already be-
lieve that their intimate media are legally protected, of course, 
they will not be deterred from creating media now, though they 
may later be harmed by a relationship betrayal, and they need 
1. 
 89. Cf. id. at 2038–39 (“Romantic partners who understand this legal pe-
culiarity may be deterred from producing intimate media, surrendering a ben-
efit to themselves and, by extension, to society.” (emphasis added)). Bambauer 
is skeptical both that no one is deterred from producing intimate media by this 
risk and also that the risk is part of the fun for any significant number of pro-
ducers. Id. at 2085. I’m more unsure; sex has a funny relationship to risk. Car-
los Danger/Anthony Weiner, one of Bambauer’s cautionary tales, is a good ex-
ample: his right to control his media output was irrelevant to what he did, and 
we might speculate that compulsion ruled. Id. I don’t contest that believing 
that one had perfect control over dissemination could increase creation overall. 
Snapchat is popular for a reason. See generally SNAPCHAT, http://www 
.snapchat.com (last visited Apr. 21, 2014). But creation stories are often a lot 
more complicated than a pure dose-response relationship.  
 90. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 235, 
237–39 (1991) (describing copyright myths believed by nonlawyers); Cecilia 
Ogbu, I Put Up a Website About My Favorite Show and All I Got Was This 
Lousy Cease-and-Desist Letter: The Intersection of Fan Sites, Internet Culture, 
and Copyright Owners, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 279, 283–85 (2003) (noting 
widespread misunderstanding of copyright law); Carolyn Elefant, Judicial 
Candidates Brawl over Campaign Slogans, LEGAL BLOG WATCH (Sept. 5, 
2008, 3:17 PM), http://legalblogwatch.typepad.com/legal_blog_watch/2008/09/ 
judicial-candid.html (noting a candidate for judicial office who confuses 
trademark claim with copyright claim). See generally PATRICIA EWICK & 
SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 
(1998) (cataloging ways in which lay understandings of law diverge from for-
mal law). 
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no additional incentive for creation.91 To the extent that they 
don’t understand their rights, the issue is largely one of educa-
tion, and even a change in the law won’t change that lack of 
understanding. The knowledge gap affects both the creators (in 
need of incentives) and the unauthorized disseminators (in 
need of disincentives).92
Consider in this context the teenagers who’ve been arrest-
ed for disseminating child pornography because they shared in-
timate media, sometimes consensually.
 
93 Whether the problem 
lies in their understanding of the law, or their practical capaci-
ty to conform their conduct to the law, an additional civil reme-
dy seems unlikely to deter what criminal law and the prospect 
of lifetime sex offender registration hasn’t.94
 
 91. Bambauer argues that a residual right of a recipient to possess inti-
mate media, even after the end of a relationship, is not problematic because 
that’s a manageable risk for creators: (1) it’s well-known that former lovers 
can hang on to memorabilia, and (2) risk-averse creators can use time-limited 
media such as Snapchat. Bambauer, supra note 
 Nor are most pro-
ducers of explicit intimate media likely to be complying with 18 
U.S.C. § 2257(a), which provides that any person who produces 
visual depictions of “actual sexually explicit conduct” must 
1, at 2060. As to the former 
point, Bambauer’s argument for providing a new right was that it would pro-
vide an additional incentive to create intimate media. Id. The problem he 
identifies isn’t lack of knowledge of the risk of dissemination, but rather 
knowledge and the associated rational response to that risk: limiting produc-
tion. Id. The same incentive logic would seem to apply to the common 
knowledge that memorabilia often outlast a relationship. As to the latter 
point, if technological self-help is sufficient to deal with residual risk, why isn’t 
it enough to reassure the risk-sensitive people now? After all, Snapchat is 
most risk-limiting with respect to short-term or new relationships. See gener-
ally supra note 89 and accompanying text. The person who creates intimate 
media with or for someone she’s been seeing for five years is less likely to use 
Snapchat precisely because she trusts her partner. 
 92. See generally Bambauer, supra note 1. 
 93. See, e.g., John A. Humbach, ‘Sexting’ and the First Amendment, 37 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 433 (2010); Beth Defalco, Girl, 14, Arrested over Nude 
Pics of Herself, DENVER POST (Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.denverpost 
.com/search/ci_12006602; Caroline Zielinski, Teens Arrested over Explicit Pho-
tos, AGE VICTORIA (July 3, 2013), http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/teens 
-arrested-over-explicit-photos-20130703-2pb65.html. 
 94. It’s also notable that many people of sexting age probably have down-
loaded music and/or movies without permission from copyright owners. Kurt 
Peters, Technology, Not Ethics, Worry Teens About Illegal Downloading, Study 
Says, INTERNET RETAILER (May 21, 2004), http://www.internetretailer.com/ 
2004/05/21/technology-not-ethics-worry-teens-about-illegal-downloading-s 
(finding that over 50% of teens have illegally downloaded music). If people of 
sexting age don’t fear statutory damages enough to avoid unauthorized down-
loads, how likely is it that they’ll fear statutory damages enough to decide 
against sharing a sexy photo? 
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“create and maintain individually identifiable records pertain-
ing to every performer portrayed.”95 Many producers and dis-
seminators of intimate media could have bigger problems than 
copyright, if the law ever came knocking.96 If we’re really wor-
ried about people declining to create intimate media because 
they accurately understand the state of the law, we might want 
to look at the criminal code first. In truth, as Bambauer says, 
“the deterrence story is simply that: a story. It does no real 
work in changing behavior.”97
Relatedly, most people never consult lawyers, and most le-
gal wrongs go unredressed in court.
 (He says that about the creators 
of intimate media, but it is at least as true of the distributors.) 
98
 
 95. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(a) (2012). Not all intimate media would qualify: only 
“images of intercourse, masturbation, or a ‘lascivious display’ of genitals, as 
opposed to nudity or other sexually suggestive poses” are covered by the law. 
Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Holder, No. 09-4607, 2013 WL 3761077, at *20 (E.D. 
Pa. July 18, 2013). Still, the intimate media Bambauer discusses would appar-
ently include many works also covered by § 2257. A producer subject to § 2257 
must “affix[] to every copy of any [visual depiction covered by § 2257] . . . a 
statement describing where the records required by [§ 2257] with respect to all 
performers depicted in that copy of the matter may be located.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2257(e)(1). Producers must maintain copies of their performers’ identifica-
tion documents and make those records available for inspection by the Attor-
ney General. Id. §§ 2257(b)(3), (c). Producers may be exposed to criminal liabil-
ity if they “fail to create or maintain the records as required” or knowingly 
violate other provisions of the law, including knowingly transferring any visu-
al depiction subject to § 2257 that does not contain the required label. Id. 
§ 2257(f)(1)–(5). 
 Victims may have diffi-
culty finding a lawyer with expertise in the subject. They may 
be ashamed of being betrayed, and fear greater exposure if they 
sue—this is known as the “Streisand effect” from an early case 
in which photos of Barbra Streisand’s house spread more wide-
 96. Cf. Connection Distrib. Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 321, 336–39 (6th Cir. 
2009) (declining to decide whether § 2257 was overbroad as applied to media 
created, but not distributed, by couples for their own enjoyment; government 
disclaimed intent to enforce law against materials that were never distribut-
ed). It’s unclear whether the government’s promise would extend to the kinds 
of intimate media sharing Bambauer discusses, though a determined prosecu-
tor could likely proceed in some of the scenarios Bambauer describes. 
 97. Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2042. 
 98. Cf. PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL 
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 61–76 (1993) 
(stating that survey results show that a significant number of medical mal-
practice victims never file tort claims). See generally ROBERT ELLICKSON, OR-
DER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (discussing 
general reluctance of many people to litigate disputes even when law is clear); 
EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 90 (discussing nonlawyers’ use and understand-
ing of law in ordinary life and unwillingness to use legal system except in rare 
circumstances). 
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ly as she attempted to suppress them.99 Many of the victims 
whose cases Bambauer discusses would already have been able 
to send DMCA takedown notices. In any case in which they 
were both the subject and the photographer/videographer (that 
is, any case involving a “selfie”), they would already be authors 
under current law. Both Bambauer and I agree that the fact 
that those victims are also considered “authors” is unrelated to 
the harm they suffer from unconsented distribution.100
Even for existing author-victims, of course, Bambauer’s 
proposed reforms could increase the chance of receiving damag-
es from a potentially deep-pocketed intermediary, so perhaps 
lawyers would more aggressively seek out clients (though if 
there’s widespread compliance with the amended DMCA, then 
we’re back to the scenario in which there’s not much money in 
any given case).
 None-
theless, it’s notable that lawyers don’t seem to be bringing 
droves of copyright infringement lawsuits on behalf of selfie 
victims. 
101
B. TU QUOQUE: IS THIS ANY WORSE THAN WHAT WE ALREADY 
HAVE? 
 My aim in this section is simply to show that 
the identification of behaviors we wish to incentivize does not 
mean that copyright is an appropriate tool, even if copyright is 
also about incentives. 
Bambauer’s basic response to the distinctions between 
what we now call copyright and what he wants to add to Title 
17 is to point to the inconsistencies in current copyright law: 
[C]opyright is nothing if not a congeries of industry-specific tweaks. 
Copyrights in sound recordings do not include a right of public per-
formance—except via digital audio transmission. Architectural works 
under copyright have no protection against photographs or pictures 
that reproduce a building instantiating the work, so long as that 
building is publicly visible. The first sale doctrine lets lawful purchas-
ers rent movie DVDs, but not software DVDs. A small cafe may show 
television programming on a set behind the bar [without paying a li-
cense fee], but a giant restaurant in Times Square may not—unless it 
complies with restrictions on the size and number of televisions and 
speakers. Copyright is unprincipled: it is all about special pleading. 
 
 99. The “Streisand effect” is the unintentional increased publicity that oc-
curs when one tries to keep something secret. See generally Charles Arthur, 
The Streisand Effect: Secrecy in the Digital Age, GUARDIAN, Mar. 18, 2009, 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2009/mar/20/streisand-effect-internet 
-law. 
 100. See generally Bambauer, supra note 1. 
 101. Id. 
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Distortion of an elegant copyright system is not a risk, because it is 
already distorted.102
Indeed, U.S. copyright law has a number of medium- and 
industry-specific provisions that mostly can be explained by 
lobbying and special pleading. Copyright isn’t pure, so the ar-
gument goes, introducing another impurity is not a problem.  
 
At some point, however, impurity converts to a new sub-
stance, which is what Bambauer’s proposal does. None of the 
provisions Bambauer discusses were introduced merely to cir-
cumvent limits on some other right, which is why none of them 
required wholesale changes in every aspect of copyright—the 
addition of a digital public performance right for sound record-
ings, for example, did not require a change in authorship rules, 
liability standards, or fair use defenses.103 Nor did the extension 
of protection to architectural works (required by our accession 
to the Berne Convention).104
Relatedly, all of these are industry-specific tweaks, di-
rected at the economic needs and market configurations that 
were current at the moment the legislature acted. They aren’t 
content-based. By contrast, the intimate media right isn’t about 
the business deals and compromises made by any industry. It’s 
about protecting a privacy interest. If an intimate media right 
is a copyright, I have difficulty seeing the barriers to giving a 
victim of defamation a copyright, or even doing the same for 
any subject of a work, defamatory or not.
  
105
 
 102. Id. at 2076 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 2053 (noting existence of 
overlapping claims in the current system). 
 Authorship may be 
 103. The closest analogy is probably the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act 
(VHDPA), which created an extremely limited right to prevent copying of oth-
erwise unprotectable boat hulls. See Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 105-304, §§ 501–502, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 1301–1332 (2012)). This provision, which is essentially and well-deservedly 
unused, does not strike me as a model to be emulated. In practical terms, pro-
ponents of expanding the law to protect fashion designs have faced controversy 
that have so far blocked change, even though the VHDPA was written precise-
ly so that it could later be expanded to cover other subject matter. See 17 
U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Para-
dox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 
1687, 1754 (2006). Regardless of the merits of fashion design rights, the histo-
ry of this provision indicates that putting a new right in the Copyright Act 
doesn’t go unnoticed, and that the label “copyright” doesn’t refute the legal 
and policy arguments deployed against expansion.  
 104. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012); see also 1990 H.R. REP. NO. 101-735 
(1990), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6936–37. 
 105. See Susan Corbett, The Case for Joint Ownership of Copyright in Pho-
tographs of Identifiable Persons, MEDIA & ARTS L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 
2013), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=23433 
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a highly flexible concept, but that doesn’t make it entirely 
meaningless. 
I’m a fan of categorical thinking. It can make sense to 
group “games” together even if we can say that chess doesn’t 
share any significant characteristics with bouncing a ball, as 
long as each game has family resemblances to other games in 
the group.106 Still, there is a difference between a concept with a 
wide range of reasonable meanings and a concept that has been 
completely emptied out.107
C. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NEW SYSTEM 
 To my mind, calling an intimate me-
dia right “copyright” would tilt too far to the latter. 
Bambauer is aware that he’s suggesting some radical revi-
sions. Among the consequences is the potential vulnerability of 
his new right to a First Amendment challenge, even though 
copyright laws are generally unproblematic under current doc-
trine.108 Bambauer suggests that his proposal would be consti-
tutionally suspect if called a privacy right, but that the relaxed 
scrutiny given to copyright laws would protect this new right if 
it were called copyright.109 However, no judge is that bald-faced 
about formalism, as Bambauer recognizes.110 The Supreme 
Court has specifically identified fair use as a key constitutional 
limit on copyright, and his proposal removes fair use as a de-
fense.111
Because the “traditional contours” of copyright would be al-
tered in every particular by the new intimate media right, some 
other kind of First Amendment scrutiny would have to apply.
  
112
 
57 (advocating that all photographic subjects should have copyrights in photos 
of them). 
 
Bambauer suggests that his proposed newsworthiness defense 
would suffice to allow the new right to survive First Amend-
 106. See GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT 
CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHIL-
OSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 66 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958). 
 107. Cf. Don Herzog, As Many as Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast, 
75 CAL. L. REV. 609, 629 (1987) (arguing that, even if there are plausible ar-
guments over constitutional meaning, it would be a misreading of the Consti-
tution to read it “as the story of a small boy growing up in Kansas”). 
 108. See generally Bambauer, supra note 1. 
 109. Id. at 2078–84. 
 110. See id. 
 111. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20, 222 (2003) (stating that cop-
yright is, absent alterations to its “traditional contours,” constitutionally un-
problematic). 
 112. Id. at 221. 
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ment scrutiny, based on precedent from privacy cases.113
Bambauer offers the following dichotomy: “copyright is left 
with an uncomfortable dilemma: either the line of cases finding 
newsworthiness to be adequate free speech protection in other 
contexts is misguided, or fair use must be analyzed formalisti-
cally.”
 Here, 
the snake swallows its own tail, formalism (copyright is a First 
Amendment-free zone) converting to functionalism (newswor-
thiness is an appropriate defense) just at the point at which 
Bambauer acknowledges that labels can’t be dispositive.  
114 There’s another alternative, which is that copyright is 
doing different things than other laws, requiring different First 
Amendment limits. One could equally assert that fair use in 
every copyright case, including Prince v. Cariou as it was actu-
ally litigated, could constitutionally be replaced by newswor-
thiness, or by the constitutionally required limits on defama-
tion.115
Current precedents from the privacy torts could make 
newsworthiness a sufficient First Amendment limit on the new 
intimate media right, certainly as applied to individual 
uploaders.
 One could also argue that the requirements of falsity 
and malice for defamation could be replaced with fair use’s con-
sideration of transformativeness and market harm. Those 
switches don’t make sense, however, because the justifications 
for the rights, and correspondingly the interests involved on 
both sides, differ.  
116
 
 113. Bambauer, supra note 
 But a key question, unanswered by Bambauer’s 
analysis, is how newsworthiness would interact with new forms 
of dissemination. Newsworthiness case law developed in the 
context of traditional publishers’ deliberate selections of what 
to publish. Imposing liability on ISPs for non-newsworthy im-
1, at 2078–84. 
 114. Id. at 2083–84.  
 115. Cf. Prince v. Cariou, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 116. A case he cites with favor, Toffoloni v. LFP Publishing Group, 572 
F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2009), has very weak reasoning. See Bambauer, supra 
note 1, at 2083. Upholding a privacy claim against the publication of nude 
photos, though not against the publication of text about the photos, the 
Toffoloni court declined to give any weight to the veridical effects of the pho-
tos. Toffoloni, 572 F.3d at 1213. This is not to say that other courts won’t fol-
low that reasoning. Courts are often willing to treat images as worthless, un-
less they’re treating them as ineffable. See Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a 
Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 707, 708 & 
n.112 (2012). For these purposes, I simply wish to note that what Bambauer 
presents as a descriptive claim—the case law suggests that his proposed new 
right is constitutional—ends up having strong normative implications as well: 
suppressing images is no great loss. But see generally Bambauer, supra note 1. 
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ages disseminated by their users is not obviously constitution-
al, certainly not when it comes to vicarious liability, which 
doesn’t require knowledge.117 In general, the Supreme Court 
has been wary of liability for speech distributors in the absence 
of fault.118
D. ME TOO: OTHER CANDIDATES FOR “COPYRIGHT” EXTENSION 
 Even if this new right might be constitutional as ap-
plied to perfidious individuals, then, the key part of the reme-
dy—its extension to intermediaries, which defeats § 230’s im-
munity—might not be. 
Bambauer notes that we’ve increased copyright enforce-
ment and remedies in order to go after massive online copying, 
without particular evidence that this helped copyright own-
ers.119 Thus, he concludes, we need not be sure that his pro-
posed reform would work before we enact it.120
 
 117. See Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, In-
ternet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 
11 (2006); Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42 GA. L. REV. 309 (2008) 
(arguing that the First Amendment puts constitutional limits on intermediary 
liability even in copyright). 
 I don’t find that 
analogy persuasive. It seems to me to be an argument about 
industry capture, not about good policy. However, the compari-
son does strengthen my fear that any rights given to subjects of 
intimate media will be demanded on fairness and economic in-
centive grounds by other groups much better positioned to 
make incentive-based claims as rational economic actors seek-
ing only profit maximization. Given the expansions in the scope 
of copyright rights and remedies required to make Bambauer’s 
new right effective, the likely demands for parity between exist-
ing copyright rights and new intimate media rights strike me 
as undesirable side effects of putting his proposed new right in 
Title 17. 
 118. E.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 n.2, 76 
n.5 (1994) (stating that the First Amendment requires that a distributor must 
know the victim’s age to support a conviction for distributing child pornogra-
phy; producers are in a unique position to verify age, and distributors are not); 
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (holding that liability for distributing 
obscenity requires scienter). Section 2257 of Title 18, mentioned above, also 
avoids constitutional problems by specifically limiting the obligations of non-
producer disseminators—they can only be liable for knowingly selling or trans-
ferring materials without the requisite labels indicating that the producer 
kept the appropriate age and identity records. In addition, they have “no duty 
to determine the accuracy of the contents of the statement or the records re-
quired to be kept.” 18 U.S.C. § 2257(f)(4) (2012). 
 119. Bambauer, supra note 1, at 2050. 
 120. Id. 
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I find particularly puzzling Bambauer’s contention that us-
ing copyright would solve the problem of § 230: 
[U]sing IP law effectively addresses issues with intimate media with-
in the existing statutory framework for Internet intermediaries. Oth-
er approaches, such as privacy-based ones, would need to alter the 
contours of the immunity for interactive computer services from 
third-party liability created by Section 230 . . . . Some of these pro-
posals would not merely alter Section 230, they would eviscerate it. 
This is undesirable. Section 230 has been critical to the development 
of a thriving Internet ecosystem based largely on content supplied by 
users.121
But Bambauer’s proposal isn’t operating in secret. It’s perfectly 
obvious that his new right is designed to evade § 230. He even 
touts that as a virtue.
 
122
Beyond § 230, many other claimants would have an inter-
est in getting the benefits of this new right’s divergence from 
existing copyright rights. For example, proponents of publicity 
rights could ask why other, nonsexual portrayals wouldn’t jus-
tify similar veto rights (subject to a newsworthiness defense).
 Yet other claimants are equally capa-
ble of deploying formalist concepts to serve realist ends. Any at-
tempt to enact this proposal would give everyone whose ox is 
gored by § 230 an opportunity to show up and argue that their 
interests should be considered “copyright” interests too, at least 
for purposes of avoiding § 230, since we’re already doing a lot of 
tailoring of “copyright” to deal with intimate media. I can see 
no functional or political difference between amending Title 17 
to evade § 230 and amending § 230 itself. Either intermediaries 
depend on § 230 and we should leave it alone, or we should be 
willing to tweak it to impose a new duty on them because re-
venge porn is so bad.  
123 
Additionally, Jessica Silbey’s empirical work reveals a strong 
desire for more rights to control reputation among creators; 
many of them would welcome a new moral right of withdraw-
al.124
 
 121. Id. at 2054. 
 Copyright owners of all stripes would also love to have a 
new right to control, and therefore monetize, private perfor-
mance and display. If this is a copyright, after all, then other 
copyright owners have similarly (and more plausibly incentive-
based) claims for control.  
 122. Id. at 2055. 
 123. See Corbett, supra note 105. 
 124. JESSICA SILBEY, HARVESTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: IP INTER-
VENTIONS AND THE ROLES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES IN CREATIVE AND 
INNOVATIVE WORK (forthcoming 2013) (arguing that creators withhold works 
from certain markets because they fear loss of control). 
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Likewise, many copyright owners would be thrilled to get 
rid of the timely registration requirement for statutory damag-
es. Most small copyright owners—precisely the group unlikely 
to timely register—have the same difficulties as victims of re-
venge porn in finding legal representation, and thus an equally 
compelling argument for extension of this new remedy to 
them.125 And copyright owners hate the burdens placed on them 
by the DMCA’s notice and takedown requirements, which they 
perceive as forcing them into an endless game of whack-a-
mole.126
  CONCLUSION   
 If we’re creating a new notice and takedown scheme 
with different contours, surely their desires should be taken in-
to account as well.  
Bambauer’s paper challenges us to navigate the is and the 
ought: whatever copyright ought to be, he argues, is less im-
portant for people interested in protecting victims of noncon-
sensual exposure than what it is, which cannot be known at a 
conceptual level but can only be observed from the actual 
messy contours of copyright and therefore can be changed in 
order to serve any reasonable purpose.127
 
 125. See, e.g., OSTERREICHER & CALZADA, supra note 
 But categories, how-
ever imperfect, exist for reasons—reasons that even realists 
generally acknowledge. Contradictions and inconsistencies are 
inevitable, but that doesn’t mean they’re all of equal worth. 
Bambauer’s claim that copyright can be whatever we want as 
long as we mention incentives seems to me not to be useful, in 
Felix Cohen’s formulation: “a definition is useful if it insures 
against risks of confusion more serious than any that the defi-
54, at 7. 
 126. For a very small but representatively vituperative set of criticisms, 
see Broadcast Music Inc., Comments of Broad. Music, Inc. on Dep’t of Com-
merce Copyright Green Paper, at 13–14, available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ 
files/ntia/bmi_comments.pdf; Global Intellectual Property Ctr., Chamber of 
Commerce, GIPC Comments to DOC on Digital Copyright Issues, at 6–7, 
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/global_intellectual_property_ 
center_comments.pdf; Indep. Film & Television Alliance, Comments of IFTA, 
at 5–6, available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/independent_film_and_ 
television_association_comments.pdf; Nat’l Music Publishers’ Ass’n et al., 
Comments of Nat’l Music Publishers’ Ass’n et al., at 14–15, available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/national_music_publishers_association_et._ 
al._comments.pdf; Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc., Comments of the Re-
cording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc., at 4, available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ 
files/ntia/recording_industry_association_of_america_comments.pdf. 
 127. See generally, Bambauer, supra note 1. 
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nition itself contains.”128
 
 128. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Ap-
proach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 836 (1935). 
 A more productive debate would con-
sider a right against revenge porn, and the relationship be-
tween individual and intermediary liability for revenge porn, 
on its own merits. 
